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NOTES AND COMMENT
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE TERmINIELLO

CASE

On the evening of February 7, 1946, the Rev. Arthur W.
Terminiello addressed a group of more than 800 people in a Chicago
auditorium. Outside, a crowd of about 1,000 persons that had
gathered to protest the meeting had been transformed into a howling,
turbulent and unmanageable mob. As he spoke, window'-panes were
being shattered by bricks and other missiles hurled from outside,
doors battered in, and ice-picks, rocks and bottles thrown at police
stationed at the doors. Cursing and other threatening utterances,
easily audible inside the auditorium, emanated from without during
the entire session. It was in this electrifying atmosphere that the
defendant proceeded to deliver an explosive and infuriating speech,
vehemently denouncing those outside and certain other individuals
and groups in the most vicious terms of contempt imaginable. The
response from his audience, friendly for the most part, was instantaneous and many became aroused and enraged. For this speech
the defendant was charged with disorderly conduct in violation of a
city ordinance of Chicago.' In the instructions to the jury the trial
court stated that a "breach of the peace" may consist of any misbehavior which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about
a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the in-habitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm." 2
The jury found him guilty and the highest court in Illinois sustained
the conviction.3 However, on May 16, 1949, the United States
Supreme Court by a 5-4 decision held that the city ordinance as construed by the Illinois courts had deprived the defendant of the right
of free speech4 given him by the Federal Constitution and reversed
his conviction.
I "All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any
improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to
a breach of the peace, within the limits of the city ... shall be deemed guilty
of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction thereof, shall be severally fined not
less than one dollar nor more than two hundred dollars for each offense."
§ 1(1), c. 193, Rev. Code 1939, City of Chicago.
2 Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 895 (1949).
3 Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 Ill. 23, 79 N. E. 2d 39 (1948), aff'g 332 Ill.
App. 17, 74 N. E. 2d 45 (1947).
4 Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894 (1949). Mr. Justice Vinson and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote dissents to the effect that since the instruction
of the trial court in question was not in issue in the state courts it could not
be passed upon by the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Jackson dissented on the
merits.
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The decision occasioned an unusual amount of excitement and
much attention was focused on it by the press.5 The legal profession
was also stirred to action and the Federal Bar Association of New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut passed a resolution to arrange a
forum in which the decision would be interpreted to the lay public.'
Though in some quarters the decision met with approval,7 the general reaction was one of dismay and it was felt that the Supreme
Court had taken an extreme step that was apt to lead to unfortunate
consequences. Sharp criticism of the case was forthcoming from
leaders of certain religious congregations.8 Comment from other
sources was that the decision had added confusion to the already
perplexing problem of what constitutes the legal limits of free speech.9
Many expressed the fear that the decision would enable a rabblerousing agitator to speak unmolested regardless of the turbulence
caused by his words and that the order so vital for the retention of
our civil liberties would thus be susceptible to obliteration. 10 To
determine whether or not such apprehension is justified is the sole
object of what follows.
The right to freedom of expression has as its constitutional basis
the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution." The First
Amendment secures this right against invasion by the United States
and through the Fourteenth Amendment this protection is extended
5The Terminiello Decisioit, Editorial, N. Y. Times, May 21, 1949; Douglas
and Jackson, Editorial, N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 19, 1949; Free Speech is
Fine, But, Editorial, N. Y. Daily News, May 18, 1949.
6 Mr. Emil K. Ellis, chairman of the Association's bill of rights committee
and sponsor of the motion, stated that "the decision had been widely misinterpreted both by the public and with few exceptions by the press." N. Y. Times,
May 27, 1949, p. 19, col. 5.
"The decision was praised by Roger N. Baldwin, executive director of
the American Civil Liberties Union, who argued that otherwise any meeting
could be broken up 'where opponents alleged that it was likely to rouse them
to violent protest.'" Time, May 30, 1949, p. 14, col. 2.
8 "Assailing the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case
of Rev. Arthur W. Terminiello, involving free speech, Rabbi William F.
Rosenblum in Temple Israel, 210 West Ninety-first Street, held yesterday that
the majority of the court 'overlooked the fact that every citizen is entitled to
be protected from slander and libel.'" N. Y. Times, May 22, 1949, p. 39, col. 1.

S"Between them, the majority and minority had managed to confuse fur-

ther the complex line which defines the reasonable limits to freedom of speech."
Time, May 30, 1949, p. 14, col. 3. The majority "confused though it did not
destroy, local prevention and punishment of 'fighting words' inciting to riot."
Krock, It the Nation, N. Y. Times, May 19, 1949, p. 28, col. 5.
10 "A lot of good people have got the notion that rabble-rousing is indorsed,
on the theory that the doctrine of free speech is illimitable." Douglas arnd
Jackson, Editorial, N. Y. Herald Tribune. May 19, 1949. "At the present time
almost nobody but the Communists will profit by this ruling . . . . Every
agitator nailed for inciting to riot from now on can be expected to lean heavily
on the Terminiello decision." Free Speech is Fine, But, Editorial, N. Y.
Daily News, May 18, 1949.
11U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...."
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to include infringement by a state.1 2 While it is the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies directly to state action, nevertheless the
specific limiting principles of the First Amendment usually govern in
all cases involving freedom of speech. 13
The right to speak as one pleases is far from being an absolute
right. 14 "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." 15 These are extreme cases
and are of little aid in the quest to determine the constitutional limits
of free speech. It is when we leave these obviously unprotected
classes of speech that the real problem becomes apparent. The right
to free speech is not absolute, but where is the point at which permissible deprivation begins? The line of demarcation is a fluctuating
one and the Supreme Court has abstained from attempting a precise
delimitation. The nearest approach to a concrete test appears in the
precedent-making statement of Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
that "The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." 16 The term "clear and present
danger" has many connotations, of course, and the court in any given
instance must subjectively determine what is a "clear and present
danger" to a large degree unaided or perhaps unhampered by precedent.17 What to one court or judge may be a "clear and present
danger" may not be to another court or judge. Thus in several instances we see Mr. Justice Holmes, the originator of the rule, differing with his colleagues as to its application.' 8 That no hard and fast
rule will be laid down seems certain and any possible attempt to do
so inadvisable. Changing social, economic and political conditions
would make an inflexible criterion impractical.
12 "The freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States is similarly secured to all persons
by the Fourteenth against abridgment by a state." Schneider v. Irvington,
308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939).
'2 See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624,
639 (1943).
"1 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942).
15d. at 571.
16 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
'1 "This court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a
danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed
present . . . ." Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California,
274 U. S. 357, 374 (1927).
Is See Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S.
652, 672 (1925), and Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 624 (1919).
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The "clear and present danger" test has been applied in many
diverse situations. It has been used to reverse convictions for contempt of court arising out of the publication of newspaper editorials. 19
Its application has resulted in the invalidating of a state statute which
penalized individuals for disseminating propaganda tending to encourage disloyalty to the state and national government.2 0 Picketing
of another's premises has been upheld on the ground that it presents
no "clear and present danger." 21 An espionage act 22 and a deportation statute 23 were both held to be subject to this rule. On the
affirmative side, it has been
utilized in sustaining the validity of a
24
criminal syndicalism act.

The extent to which the Supreme Court has gone in recent years
to protect freedom of speech is rather remarkable. Enforcement of a
statute requiring the registration of individuals who solicit membership in unions was held to be an unconstitutional restraint of free
speech.2 5 Ordinances vesting local officials with discretion as to when
public meeting places 26 or amplifying devices 27 may be used have
been held invalid. In Marsh v. Alabama 28 the court struck down a
statute which made it unlawful to remain on the premises of another
after having been warned not to do so, reasoning that as between
property rights and civil liberties the latter occupy the preferred position. Even the United States Government is powerless to exclude
from its property groups bent on propagating their views.29
The question that now arises is whether the Terminiello case
has snapped the elastic concept of liberality manifested by the foregoing decisions. Has the Supreme Court been so zealous in its role
as guardian of the constitutional liberties of the American people that
it has overplayed its part and let free a means by which the very
ideals it seeks to protect may be destroyed?
Though it is our opinion that at times in the past the present
Supreme Court has been overly protective of the right to free speech,
particularly in such cases as Marsh v. Alabama, it is nevertheless felt
that on the issue of free speech the Terminiello decision is thoroughly
sound and logical, entirely consonant with precedent, and that its possible consequences have been tremendously over-exaggerated. Misconception of the holding in the case is caused by taking into con19 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314
U. S. 252 (1941).
20 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583 (1943).
21 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 105 (1940).
22 Hartzel v. United States, 322 U. S. 680 (1944).
23 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 157 (1945) (concurring opinion).
24 See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 372 (1927)
(concurring
opinion).
25 Thomas vCollins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945).
2
6Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
27 Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
28 326 U. S. 501 (1946).
29 Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517 (1946).
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sideration only the character of the defendant's speech and the circumstances surrounding it and the decision of the court which allowed his apparent misbehavior to go unpunished.80 On the issue of
free speech, this case decides but one thing, and that is that a man

cannot be penalized merely because his speech either stirred people
to anger, invited public dispute or brought about a condition of unrest. The conviction was reversed because the trial court's instruction to the jury permitted the defendant to be found guilty on any one
of the foregoing grounds. Thus the whole case turned on the instruction to the jury. The Supreme Court did not decide that his
speech was one for which he could not be constitutionally punished.
Indeed, the court expressly stated that it was not ruling on that
point.3 1
In this light it is difficult to argue that the decision was an erroneous one. It cannot be denied that the right of free speech would be
severely curtailed if every remark producing either anger, dispute or
unrest were punished. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
much more must be present before a restriction of speech will be
sanctioned. There must exist a "clear and present danger" of a substantive evil, and that substantive evil "must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can
be punished." 32 Assuredly, "a condition of unrest" falls far short
of meeting the quoted requisites of a "substantive evil." In Cantwell
v. Connecticut3 3 the petitioner had stopped two pedestrians and requested permission to play to them a phonograph record. The permission was granted. The record strongly criticized the religious
faith of the two listeners and so enraged them that they were tempted
to strike the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that "Although
the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity . . .
in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish
specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State" 84 the petitioner's communication did
not constitute a breach of the peace. (Emphasis supplied.) Arousing "animosity" then is not in and of itself a "clear and present
danger" and it would seem that the quoted extract from the Cantwell
opinion furnishes ample justification for the majority holding in the
Terminiello case.
Thus the Terminiello decision is perfectly in harmony with previous rulings of the Supreme Court, a feature that is disturbingly
30 By the fact that Terminiello's "conviction for disorderly conduct in what
was plainly the worst sort of incitement to violence is now reversed, the
Supreme Court has placed itself in the position of approving a reprehensible
act." Douglas and Jackson, Editorial, N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 19, 1949.
31 Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 895 (1949).
32 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263 (1941).
334 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
3 Id. at 311.
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absent from many present day decisions of that court.3 5 The unpredictability of the Supreme Court and the frequency of utterly irreconcilable and bitterly-worded dissenting opinions have brought about
great confusion in many instances. 36 There can be no doubt but that
the highly persuasive and pulverizing dissent of Mr. Justice Robert
H. Jackson in the case under discussion 37 is responsible for much
of the anxiety evidenced in the press and elsewhere. Ruthlessly
attacking the majority opinion, he concluded that "There is danger
that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little
practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into
a suicide pact." 38 For reasons already stated we do not feel that
this admonition is necessary, nor do we agree with his statement that
the majority opinion promulgates a dogma "of'absolute freedom for
irresponsible and provocative utterance which almost completely
sterilizes the power of local authorities to keep the peace as against
this kind of tactics." 39 Had the prosecution been merely for the use
of "fighting words," a conviction undoubtedly would have been upheld on the ground that it produced "a clear and present danger"
which took the speech without the realm of constitutional guaranties. 40 The State of Illinois is not deprived of its power to keep
the peace by this decision, because if the instruction to the jury had
been couched in the indicated terminology its authority would have
been given prompt recognition.
It is somewhat ironical that this case should have been erroneously criticized as tying the hands of law-enforcement officials, for
had there been efficient police action on the evening of defendant's
speech there probably would have been no need for his arrest. He
attempted to deliver an address to an audience sympathetic to his
views and an auditorium had been hired for that purpose. Certainly
35 "Under our constitutional system, moreover, an undiscriminating disregard
of stare decisis by our Supreme Court in the interests of particular classes,
groups, or philosophies has a peculiarly deleterious and disturbing effect."
Editorial, Precedent and Certainty in Law and Life, 34 A. B. A. J. 919, 920
(1948).
36 "The present fragmentation of the Court diminishes its prestige and substitutes for what was once regarded as the sacred oracular voice of an impersonal institution a babel of confused and jangling human tongues. It introduces a strong element of instability and unpredictability into the law that
causes great concern and perplexity to counsel charged with the responsibility
of advising clients and to the lower courts." Palmer, Present Dissents: Causes
of the Justices' Disagreements, 35 A. B. A. J. 189 (1949).
37 This 15 page, 8,000 word dissent is "one of the most sharply-worded
opinions of recent years." Coleman B. Jones, N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 19,
1949, in the second of two articles discussing the Terminiello case.
38 Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 911 (1949).
39 Id. at 906.
40 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 308 (1940), wherein it was stated
that "When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic
upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or
order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious."
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he was fully entitled to do this under the constitutional guaranty of
free speech. However, an unruly and hostile crowd had gathered to
protest the meeting in which he was to participate and even before
his arrival it had approached the verge of unrestrained violence.
Through either careless indifference or an inaccurate appraisal of the
seriousness of the situation, police protection for the defendant was
grossly inadequate and during his talk the mob outside got completely
out of hand. Had there been proper police protection the defendant
probably would not have been prompted to speak as he did, nor would
his words have had the explosive effect they actually had. When
bricks and every other sort of dangerous missile are being hurled in
on an audience it is much more easily stirred to violent action than
is one which listens in an atmosphere more approaching serenity.
When one has something to say he should not be silenced merely because aggressive adversaries threaten to riot if he attempts to speak.
In such cases police protection should be afforded to insure the right
to speak freely. Assuming that when such protection is absent one
should frame his utterances so as not to provoke a breach of the
peace, it is nevertheless felt that law enforcement officers are much
to blame in making such a restraint of speech necessary. More concisely, it is an unfortunate situation where one is not able to speak
freely because protection against undisciplined antagonists has not
been furnished. The defendant's right to speak was being interfered
with and he endeavored to take the law into his own hands. Though
his action, of course, cannot be completely condoned, it would seem
that a great portion of the blame should be imputed to the inadequate
police protection responsible for the creation of the tumultuous arena
in which he found himself.
In the present world-wide clash of ideologies, civil liberties are
more sacred than ever to the people of the United States. Any possible infringement upon them or threat to their existence should be
scrutinized with the utmost degree of caution. It is no wonder then
that the reaction to the Terminiello decision was so pronounced.
However, as we have endeavored to point out, the Terminiello case
does not jeopardize our precious constitutional liberties; rather it is
a reminder that 41the Supreme Court is still their ever vigilant and
ardent defender.
THOMAS A.

BOLAN.

41 In view of the fact that the trial court's instruction to the jury was not
in issue at any time in the state courts or when the case was argued before the
Supreme Court, it may well be that this case will become significant for enlarging the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court rather
than for any adjudication on the question of free speech.

